Why Judge Shirron Should Have Stepped Aside in the Reynolds NGRI Hearing

jughead73
Sep 17
4 min read

Why Judge Shirron Should Have Stepped Aside in the Reynolds NGRI Hearing

On May 7, 2024, my family, the Mauldin family, and many others sat in a Grant County courtroom and watched Judge Stephen L. Shirron enter a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict for Philip Reynolds — the man who murdered Patrick, shot Jerry Mauldin, battered another person, attempted to kill two law enforcement officers, and made serious threats of death to against others. This case does not just involve one victim.

This was not a normal case. The charges were among the most serious crimes under Arkansas law:

Capital murder with aggravating circumstances (Patrick Massey)
Two counts of attempted capital murder (firing at law enforcement)
First-degree battery (another victim)
Aggravated assault (Jerry Mauldin)

The Mauldin family, my own family, and many others all carry scars from that day. These weren’t abstract charges — they were attacks on real people, with ripple effects through entire families and communities.

If Reynolds had been found criminally responsible, he would have faced the harshest penalties available in our justice system — life without parole or even the death penalty.

What the Law Allows

Arkansas law gave Judge Shirron the power to go beyond a single report:

Arkansas Code § 5-2-305 – allows the court to order an examination of the defendant’s fitness to proceed or mental condition on its own motion.
Arkansas Code § 5-2-328(c) – requires that if a defendant gives notice of intent to rely on lack of criminal responsibility, the court must order a mental evaluation and may order further examinations if needed.

These statutes exist for exactly this type of case — where the stakes are life and death, and where multiple families are devastated by the outcome.

What Happened Instead

At Reynolds’s hearing, the State presented only a single evaluation, conducted by Dr. Melissa Wright. Even Dr. Wright’s testimony included the phrase “substantially impaired”, wording that Judge Shirron himself admitted was unclear:

THE COURT:“…on your opinion that Mr. Reynolds’ actions at the time of the alleged offenses would suggest his mental state was substantially impaired and that he did not appreciate the criminality of his actions… Therefore it is my opinion that his capacity to rationally appreciate the criminality of his actions at the time of the alleged offenses was substantially impaired.” “…So do you mean by that that he was incapable of appreciating the criminality of his actions?” WITNESS DR. MELISSA WRIGHT:“At that time, yes, I do believe that.” THE COURT:“So ‘substantially impaired’ is the same as… that he was incapable of.” WITNESS DR. MELISSA WRIGHT:“You make a good point and I will consider that moving forward, how that could be kind of confusing, because it is different wording.”

Even with this admitted ambiguity, Judge Shirron chose not to order a second evaluation — despite Arkansas law giving him the authority to do so under § 5-2-305 and § 5-2-328.

Two different standards were used:
- “Substantially impaired” suggests partial capacity — not fully gone, but not fully functional either.
- “Incapable” is absolute — meaning no capacity at all.
In criminal law, that difference is critical. Arkansas’s insanity defense (§ 5-2-312) requires proving that, due to mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct.
Saying “substantially impaired” falls short of the statutory standard. It’s not the same as “lacked capacity.”

After five years of court hearings and waiting this hearing was shockingly brief. Though the transcript records the court convened at 2:30 p.m., proceedings didn’t really begin until closer to 2:40 or 2:45. By 3:34 p.m., I had already sent a message to a family friend telling them how devastated I was, because the decision that was made. By 3:39 p.m., court was adjourned. That means this life-and-death hearing — where the court decided whether Philip Reynolds would be held criminally responsible for murder and the attempted murder of police officers — lasted barely 45 to 50 minutes.

A $500 Question

What makes this decision even harder to accept is that Judge Shirron’s campaign once received a $500 donation from Philip Reynolds’s father.

Under the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11, judges must step aside when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned — including when a party or their family has contributed to the judge’s campaign.

Even if technically legal, this contribution created the appearance of a conflict. Judge Shirron could have recused himself. He would not have lost his job or his paycheck; Arkansas judges are salaried officials. The case simply would have been reassigned.

Why This Matters

The combination of two failures —

The prosecutor’s refusal to seek a second evaluation (despite my direct request before the hearing), and
Judge Shirron’s failure to either recuse or order another evaluation himself under Arkansas law —

left not just my family, the Mauldin family, and many others with a judgment that rests on a single, unchallenged opinion. That is not justice.

When a man has killed one person and attempting to kill two police officers, battering another man, and assaulting yet another, in front of an eyewitness, the people of Arkansas deserve to know that every safeguard was used before excusing him from criminal responsibility. Instead, shortcuts and conflicts of interest defined the process.

The Bigger Picture

This tragedy is part of a larger pattern. Arkansas’s Act 911 of 1989 has been misused to release violent offenders back into communities under the label of “mental health treatment.” Families like mine are left to grieve while the system hides behind technicalities.

We must demand reform. Judges must be held to the highest standards of impartiality. Prosecutors must pursue every avenue of evidence. Victims’ families deserve nothing less.

Please consider signing our petition to reform Act 911 of 1989 it is past time to change this law.